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Notes and Comments
Certificate of Need for Health Care
Facilities: A Time for Re-examination
I. Introduction
Faced with national health care costs that have soared from
$28.98 per capita in 1940 to $141.63 in 1960, and then to $645.76
in 1976,1 as well as with the inequitable distribution of health
care resources,2 Congress and the state legislatures have re-
sponded with a variety of mechanisms s one of the most signifi-
cant of which is Certificate of Need (CON) legislation.' The
CON is a statement issued by a state agency containing the
state's formal acknowledgement that a health care facility, medi-
cal equipment acquisition, or new program is "needed."' CON
1. These health care expenditures represented 4.1% of the Gross National Product
(GNP) in 1940, 5.2% of GNP in 1960, and 8.7% in 1976. D. ABERNETHY & D. PEAISON,
REGULATING HosPrrAL CoSTs: THE DzvzLOPMNrr OF PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1979).
2. The congressional findings incorporated into the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1964 (NHPRDA) included the finding that "[tlhe massive
infusion of Federal funds into the existing health care system has contributed to infla-
tionary increases in the cost of health care and failed to produce an adequate supply or
distribution of health resources, and consequently has not made possible equal access for
everyone to such resources." 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(2) (1982).
3. Among the approaches to solve the distribution problem is the Hill-Burton Act of
1946 under which the federal government provided funds for hospital construction pur-
suant to state health plans. Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982)). In 1972, the Social Security Act was amended to include section
1122, which imposed capital expenditure review requirements on health care facilities
receiving Medicare and Medicaid payments. Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 221(a), 86 Stat. 1329,
1386 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1982)). For a description of section
1122, see J. SIMPSON & T. Bootu, Gum TO HEALTH PLANNING LAW xvi-xvii (3d ed. 1985).
4. The NHPRDA called upon the states to "administer a State certificate of need
program which applies to the obligation of capital expenditures within the State and the
offering within the State of new institutional health services and the acquisition of major
medical equipment and which is consistent with standards established by the Secretary
by regulation." 42 U.S.C. § 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (1982).
5. Criteria for need are not limited to medical necessity. See infra text accompany-
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statutes primarily affect institutional health care providers.'
The economic theory underlying CON programs is that gov-
ernment regulated centralization of specialized or expensive
health care related services and equipment is necessary to pro-
duce the economies required7 to halt the rapid escalation in
health care costs. This theory, however, has not received univer-
sal acceptance among health care planners.8
Encouraged by a 1974 federal initiative in the form of the
ing notes 56 and 57.
The CON is merely one of a number of requirements imposed on health care facili-
ties. For example, individuals or organizations embarking on the establishment of a hos-
pital must obtain a CON as a prerequisite to entering into any contractual relations
involving capital expenditures for that hospital. Once these individuals or organizations,
however, have constructed the hospital, they may not commence operating the hospital
until an operating certificate has been obtained. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805.1 (Mc-
Kinney 1985). See also id. § 2805.2(b) providing that:
An operating certificate shall not be issued by the department unless it finds
that the premises, equipment, personnel, rules and by-laws, standards of medical
care, and hospital service are fit and adequate and that the hospital will be oper-
ated in the manner required by this article and rules and regulations thereunder.
6. Although CON requirements initially applied only to acquisitions of major medi-
cal equipment by health care facilities, some states, following the lead of the federal
government, have expanded their CON statutes so as to apply to acquisitions of major
medical equipment by individual physicians. See infra notes 49-53, 81-86, and accompa-
nying text.
Third party payors (health insurance carriers) generally do not pay facility fees
where a CON has not been obtained. McNair, Selected Issues in Forming and Operating
Health Care Joint Ventures, in HzALTu CAr, LEGAL RESPONSES TO Nzw ECONOMIC
Foacas 27 (R. McNair ed. 1985). The facility fee is a fee for the use of the physical
premises on which health care is rendered. For example, a patient contemplating cat-
aract surgery may find that his insurance company will pay the fee for use of a hospital's
operating room, provided the hospital has obtained the required CON, but will not pay
for use of an operating room in a physician's office or free-standing surgical center that
lacks a CON.
7. For example, by limiting the number of beds in each hospital in a community to
that for which there is a foreseeable use, government acts to eliminate the extra costs
each hospital would otherwise incur for the maintenance of unoccupied beds. Limiting
the number of hospitals can also produce savings. The administrative expenses involved
in one 200-bed hospital would be less than the administrative expenses involved in two
100-bed hospitals. See generally Schonbrun, Making Certificate of Need Work, 57
N.C.L. Rev. 1259 (1979) (citing Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization, Hosm-
TALS, Nov. 1, 1961).
8. For an evaluation of CON legislation, see OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DRE'T oF HELTH AND HUMAN SERVIcES, REPORT TO CONGRESS,
HOsPITAL CAPITAL ExPENss: A MEDICARE PAYMENT STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE 48-50
(1986) [hereinafter REPorr To CoNGREsS]. For a discussion of the efficacy of CON, see
infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
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National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
(NHPRDA),9 all states except Louisiana enacted CON legisla-
tion.10 With President Reagan's signature on the Omnibus
Health Package of 1986,11 this federal initiative ended. The indi-
vidual states must now meet the responsibility of re-examining
their CON programs and making judgments as to whether these
programs are valuable ones that should be continued wholly at
state or local expense, with or without modification, or whether
the critics of CON theory are correct, and their CON programs
should be eliminated. This is the time to decide if CON pro-
grams are effective instruments in reversing the trend toward
rapidly increasing health care costs and in ensuring that health
care resources will be equitably distributed.
A re-examination must include an acknowledgement of the
problems encountered by health care institutions and, perhaps
more importantly, the attempts these institutions have made to
circumvent the CON process. The reasons underlying the desire
to circumvent could reveal the shortcomings of the CON process
and point toward the necessity of developing other methods of
cost containment and distribution of resources.
Part II of this Comment discusses the health care problems
that CON was created to address. Part III surveys federal and
state CON requirements. Part IV describes problems health care
providers have faced in their attempts to comply with CON stat-
utes, and mechanisms they have developed to circumvent the
statutes. Part V analyzes these methods in light of the statutory
framework of state CON statutes. Part VI considers the efficacy
of the CON process.
This Comment concludes that consideration must be given
to the replacement of CON legislation with other approaches to
cost containment and equitable distribution of health care re-
sources. It further concludes that in those states which choose to
-ontinue CON programs, the statutes must be unambiguous re-
flections of legislative intent in order to prevent the subversion
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t-14 (1982). NHPRDA offered incentives to the states to
nact CON legislation. See infra notes 26-61 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
11. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (reporting on the Act of Nov. 14, 1986,
?ub. L. No. 99-660, tit. VII, 1986 US. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. Nzws (100 Stat.) _).
1987]
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of that intent by health care providers employing circumvention
techniques, as well as by administrative agencies overstepping
the boundaries of their authority.
11. Underlying Problems Leading to the Enactment of CON
Legislation
Soaring costs are but one aspect of the problems facing
American health care.12 The distribution of health care resources
has been marked by regional and local variations that have left
groups of individuals as well as whole communities bereft of nec-
essary medical care."'
Since 1946, the federal government has evidenced legislative
concern over the inability of the health care industry to provide
facilities adequate to meet the health needs of all Americans.1 4
In 1965, Congress created the Medicare's and Medicaid's pro-
grams to ensure that lack of funds would not cause the aged and
needy to go without essential medical care. Medicare is funded
through the federal government, while Medicaid involves joint
funding by federal and state governments. Despite these efforts,
medical services continued to be inaccessible to many Ameri-
12. See supra note 1.
13. The congressional findings that were incorporated into the NHPRDA document
the economic, sociologic, and medical problems related to health care. Pub. L. No. 93-
641, § 2, 88 Stat. 2225, 2226 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k (1982)). The national
health care system suffers from "lack of uniformly effective methods of delivering health
care." 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(3)(A) (1982). See also infra note 17 and accompanying text.
14. The Hill-Burton Act enacted in 1946 provided federal funds for hospitals con-
structed pursuant to state health plans. Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982)). For a brief overview of this attempt to remedy re-
gional hospital shortages, see McKray & McKray, Federal Health Law in the United
States, in LEGAL Asrpac ov HEALTH Poucy: ISSUES AND TiEzNDs 37-38 (R. Roemer & G.
McKray, eds. 1980).
15. Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 102, 79 Stat. 286, 291-332 (1965) (current version at
42 U.S.C. 1 1395 (1982)). Medicare is a federal program of health insurance for the aged
that is funded through the federal social security and railroad retirement systems. The
basic medical coverage provided by Medicare can be augmented by voluntary participa-
tion in a supplementary insurance program, the premiums for which are paid jointly by
the individual subscriber and the federal government. See generally 1986 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUDE (CCH) 6315-16.
16. Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit I, § 121, 79 Stat. 286, 343-52 (1965) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (1982)). Medicaid is a program of health insurance for certain economically
disadvantaged persons that is funded jointly by federal and state governments. See gen-
erally 1986 MRmicAi, & MEDIcAD GUIDz (CCH) 1 14,010.
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cans 17 and medical costs continued to rise.1'
By 1974, Congress was convinced that the traditional mar-
ketplace forces were inadequate to create an appropriate health
care system.19 Patients, the health care consumers, do not ordi-
narily have the information or expertise necessary to make med-
ical choices. Consequently, they rely heavily on their physicians'
recommendations, or delegate decisions to their physicians en-
tirely.20 The physician makes the health care decision on the ba-
sis of technological feasibility and possible benefit to the patient,
with little regard for the traditional factor of cost. The availabil-
ity of insurance to provide payment of medical fees results in a
disregard of cost by both patient and physician.2 1 This places
pressure on health care facilities to expand services and bed ca-
pacity and to acquire increasingly specialized equipment, even in
the face of possible underutilization.2 2 The cost of these un-
derutilized services must be borne by the relatively few users,
thus increasing the per use cost." The premise behind CON is
17.
Widespread access and distribution problems exist with respect to medical facili-
ties and services. In many urban areas, hospitals, clinics and other medical care
institutions and services are crowded into relatively tiny sectors, while large areas
go poorly served or completely unserved. Many rural communities are completely
without a physician or any other type of health care service, while adjacent urban
areas are oversupplied.
S. REP. No. 93-1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 7879.
18. See supra note 1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(3)(C) (1982).
19. "The highly technical nature of medical services together with the growth of
third party reimbursement mechanisms act to attenuate the usual forces influencing the
behavior of consumers with respect to personal health services." S. REP. No. 93-1285, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7878.
20. Id.
21. The insurance industry refers to this disregard of costs by an insured as the
'moral hazard problem." The insured weighs the benefits of a treatment against his coin-
surance payment rather than against the total cost of treatment, most of which is likely
to be borne by the insurance company. P. JosKow, CONTROLLING HOSPrIAL COSTS 21-31
(1981).
22. Blumstein & Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation Through Certificate of
Need: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 3, 5 (citing Salkever, Competition Among Hospi-
tals, in FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH
CAM SEcTO& PAST, PRmEr AND FUTuRE 191.206 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978)).
23. According to one study, an empty hospital bed will cost at least half the amount
of an occupied one. Bovbjerg, Problems and Prospects for Health Planning: The Impor-
tance of Incentives, Standards and Procedures in Certificate of Need, 1978 UTAH L
Rzv. 83, 87 (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDicINE NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTrrOLLNO
1987]
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that it can be a method of insulating health care facilities from
the pressures to expand that are placed on them by physicians
and patients.
Increased per use cost is but one way in which underutiliza-
tion affects total medical expenditures. It has been argued that
excess supply increases demand. The availability of health care
services or facilities ensures their use - "a bed built" is "a bed
filled."' This view, known as "Roemer's law," is an underlying
assumption of CON legislation. By preventing underutilization
through restriction on capital expansion, the growth in demand
for medical resources can be curtailed.""
III. National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act
A. Federal Law
Dissatisfaction with the meager success of previous at-
tempts at health care planning led Congress to seek another ap-
proach to the problem.25 In 1974, Congress added Title XV to
'rit SuPPLY oF HosprrAL BEDS 7-16 (1976)).
24. Schonbrun, aupra note 7, at 1263 (citing Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital
Utilization, HosprrALs, Nov. 1, 1961, at 36).
The prospective payment scheme introduced into the Medicare system in 1983 dis-
courages the use of equipment and services that are available, but not medically man-
dated, by providing the hospital with a preset payment that is determined by diagnosis
and not by services rendered. See infra note 203.
25. See generally D. ABERNwm Y & D. PAEAsON, supra note 1, at 49-53 (discussing
"Roemer's law" and supply-induced demand).
While "Roemer's law" is an underlying assumption of CON policy, several studies
suggest that the theory is an invalid one. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 22, at 25.
26. The Senate report accompanying S. 2994, which became Pub. L. No. 93-641,
NHPRDA, stated that-
Existing health planning activities... have been only marginally successfuL
The performance of individual areawide comprehensive health planning agencies
has been spotty at best. Reasons for the failure of many health planning agencies
to achieve a uniformly high level of performance ... include an inadequately spe-
cific Congressional mandate at the time the legislation was originally enacted, in-
adequate funding, and inadequate authority to implement recommendations. In
addition, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has, until recently,
consistently failed to provide adequate resources, including technical assistance, to
Comprehensive Health Planning Agencies to enable them to carry out their re-
sponsibilities satisfactorily. It is hoped by the Committee that the proposed legis-
lation will go far toward solving these problems.
S. Rap. No. 93-1285, 93d Cong., 2d Ses. reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss2/5
CERTIFICATE OF NEED
the Public Health Service Act by enacting the National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act 2 7 designed to create a
nationwide health planning structure with the capability of de-
veloping and implementing policy. 2 Title XV of the Public
Health Service Act:
1) established the National Council on Health Planning and
Development" to advise the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) (originally, Health, Education and Welfare) in
issuing national guidelines for health care planning, a task made
mandatory by the statute; 0
2) established and provided funds for a nationwide system
of health service areas, based on population and availability of
resources, planning for which became the responsibility of
Health Systems Agencies (HSA's)31 designated by the Secretary
of HHS after consultation with governors of the states in which
NEWs 7879.
27. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974). This massive statute was codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t-14 (1982).
28. See supra note 26.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-3 (1982). From its inception, NHPRDA provided for strong
consumer representation on all agencies under its aegis. The original act required that
there be a minimum of five persons who are not providers of medical care among the
twelve voting members of the National Advisory Council. Pub. L. No. 93-641, §
1503(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2225, 2228 (1974). The Act was amended to increase the non-pro-
vider representation to eight of sixteen voting members. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-3(b)(1) (1982).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-i (1982).
31. An HSA was designated to serve as the local health planning agency for each
health service area. A nonprofit corporation (but not an educational institution), a public
regional planning body, or a single unit of local government was eligible for appointment
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. § 3001-1(b)(1).
A majority of the HSA members, not to exceed 60%, had to be non-provider resi-
dents of the health service area and representative of the area's health care consumers.
Id. § 3001-1(b)(3)(C)(i).
The purposes of the HSA were to: 1) improve the health of the area's residents; 2)
increase the accessibility and quality of health services; 3) limit increases in costs of
health services; 4) prevent unnecessary duplication of health services; and 5) improve
competition in the health service area. Id. J 3001-2(a).
In furtherance of these purposes, HSA's were authorized to analyze data regarding
need for, availability of, and utilization of health care resources in the health service
area; develop, implement, and periodically review health systems plans for the health
service area; approve or disapprove of the use of federal funds in the health service area;
and review and make recommendations regarding institutional and home health services
in the health service area. Id. § 3001-2(b). The HSA's were given the authority to create
subarea councils, id. § 3001-1(c), and hire professional staffs, id. § 3001-1(b)(2).
19871
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the HSA's are located;32
3) provided assistance and funding to states for develop-
ment of State Health Planning and Development Agencies
(SHPDA's) that would, with the advice of the HSA's and State-
wide Health Coordinating Council (SHCC), formulate state
health plans, and be responsible for the administration of Certif-
icate of Need programs;" and
4) required the states, as a prerequisite to receiving federal
funds for health planning, to enact and administer CON
statutes."
The legislative history of NHPRDA, as well as its language,
indicates that the heart of the statute was the CON require-
ment." Congress viewed the state CON programs as an indis-
pensable part of its program to eliminate unnecessary capital ex-
penditures that had resulted in the rapid increase in the cost of
health care." It was a must for states to "administer a State
certificate of need program which applie[d] to the obligation of
capital expenditures within the State and the offering within the
State of new institutional health services and the acquisition of
major medical equipment.' 7 The failure of a state to put such a
program into effect within a specified period of time would have
resulted in the inability of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to "make or enter into any such allotment, grant, loan,
loan guarantee, or contract"" authorized by the Act. Since 1982,
however, funding has been drastically reduced, and there have
been no sanctions for noncompliance. The noncompliance issue
has been mooted by the abrogation of Title XV of the Public
Health Service Act.
Although, through NHPRDA, the federal government man-
dated CON programs, this mandate was addressed to the states
and not to the health care facilities. It was the individual state,
32. Id. § 3001-4(b).
33. Id. §§ 300m-300m-6. See 8upra notes 4-6, 8-10.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m(d)(2)(D), 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (1982).
35. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 93-641 "recognized State certificate-of-need programs to be the ba-
sic component in an overall effort to control the unneccessary capital expenditures which
contribute so greatly to the total national health bilL" S. REP. No. 96-96, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5, reprinted in 1979 US. CoDz CONG. & Anum. Nzws 1310.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (1982).
38. Id. § 300m(2)(D).
[Vol. 7:491
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through its police power, that would enact the CON statute and
regulations with which health care facilities were required to
comply. 0 The federal law, however, has had great bearing on the
interpretation of the state laws because NHPRDA and its ac-
companying amendments and regulations have provided a model
to which the states have looked in writing and in interpreting
their statutes and regulations.' 0
NHPRDA required the SHPDA to provide for CON review
prior to implementation of:'"
1) acquisition of major medical equipment costing in excess
of $400,000;42
2) other obligations of capital expenditures in excess of
39. In a set of challenges to the constitutionality of federal and state CON require-
ments, North Carolina's states'-rights argument was rejected and the federal require-
ment was held not to infringe upon that state's rights even though enactment of a CON
statute would violate North Carolina's constitution. In In re Certificate of Need for As-
ton Park, 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973), North Carolina's highest state court ruled
the state's CON law was an impermissible exercise of the state's police power and was
violative of the state's constitution because there was no rational relationship between
the state's legitimate interest in public health and the denial of a nonprofit hospital
corporation's right to construct on private land, and with private funds, an adequately
staffed and equipped hospital. North Carolina had refused to grant a CON to the hospi-
tal corporation because the state determined that an adequate supply of hospital beds
already existed in the area. While the decision to build may well be an economically
unsound one on the hospital's part, the court reasoned, it is not within the authority of
North Carolina's legislature, as prescribed by the state's constitution, to protect the hos-
pital from bad business judgment, nor is it within the authority of the state legislature to
protect existing hospitals from competition. Id. at 551-52, 193 S.E.2d at 735-36.
The combination of the North Carolina court's prohibition against a state CON stat-
ute and the NHPRDA requirement of a CON statute as a funding prerequisite led North
Carolina to challenge the constitutionality of NHPRDA. In North Carolina ex rel Mor-
row v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), afl'd mer., 435 U.S. 962 (1978), the
district court held that NHPRDA was not an unconstitutional violation of states' rights
because a state is free to decline to enact CON legislation even though this would mean
that the state would not receive funds under NHPRDA. The court additionally found
NHPRDA to be rationally related to the legitimate interest that the federal government
has in the national health, and as such, is permitted to contain conditions ensuring that
federal funds will be efficiently used to further the national health. Id. at 535.
40. For a comprehensive listing of the cases interpreting federal and state CON
laws, see J. SIMPSON & T. BoGtm supra note 3.
41. Excluded from CON review are activities that are solely for research. 42 C.F.R. §
123.404(d) (1985).
42. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 936(a)(3), 95 Stat. 357, 572 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300n(7) (1982)) amending Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 117(b)(3), 93 Stat. 592, 619 (1979) (set-
ting the major medical equipment monetary threshold at $150,000).
1987)
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
$600,000, indexed for inflation;48
3) capital expenditures resulting in a substantial change in
bed capacity;"
4) capital expenditures resulting in a substantial change in
health services provided by a health care facility;"' and
5) offer of a new health service or reinstatement of a dis-
continued health service.4 6
Institutional health care providers, such as hospitals or
nursing homes, were subject to CON review. Federal regulations
defined "health care facilities" as hospitals, skilled nursing facil-
ities, kidney disease treatment centers, intermediate care facili-
ties, rehabilitation facilities, and ambulatory facilities.47 Health
maintenance organizations (HMO's) were largely exempt from
CON review."8
NHPRDA's focus on institutional health care providers cre-
ated a loophole that permitted private physicians to purchase
equipment for their offices without CON review, while hospitals
could purchase the same equipment only after going through
CON review. The concern developed that this loophole was re-
43. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 936(a)(2), 95 Stat. 357, 572 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300n(6) (1982)) amending Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 117(b)(3), 93 Stat. 592, 619 (1979) (set-
ting the capital expenditure monetary threshold at $150,000). The cost of studies, plans,
and other activities preliminary to the aquisition must be included in determining
whether the $400,000 and $600,000 thresholds have been reached. 42 U.S.C. § 300n(6)
and (7) (1982).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 300n(6)(B)(ii)(II) (1982).
45. Id. § 300n(6)(B)(ii)(III).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 123.404(a)(3) (1985).
47. Id. § 123.401.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6(b) (1982). Among the national health priorities set by
NHPRDA was the development of HMO's, and thus, they were placed outside the reach
of this statute: "The Congress finds that the following deserve priority consideration:...
development of medical group practices (especially those whose services are appropri-
ately coordinated or integrated with institutional health services), health maintenance
organizations, and other organized systems for the provision of health care." Id. § 300k-
2(a).
By exempting HMO's from CON, a major barrier to their market entry was re-
moved. This special status was conferred on HMO's because of the expectation that they
would provide health care more efficiently than would the traditional fee-for-service sys-
tem. HMO's differ from the fee-for-service system by providing health care at a prepaid
per capita fee. The HMO assumes the responsibility for delivering a specified range of
health care services to the enrollees, who pay a set periodic fee that is independent of
their use of the health care services. See generally H. Lurr, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGA-
NIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE (1981).
[Vol. 7:491
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sulting in a decentralization and duplication of services that
should have been centralized for optimal use of health care ser-
vices, as well as for cost containment.49
In response to this concern, an amendment to NHPRDA
was proposed that would have extended CON coverage to the
acquisition of all expensive major medical equipment, whether
by institutional health care providers or by private physicians."e
While this proposal received the support of such institutional
health care providers as the American Hospital Association,"' or-
ganized physicians opposed the extension, in any form, of CON
review to physicians' offices. 2 The amendment that was ulti-
mately passed represented a compromise between these two po-
sitions. A middle ground between requiring a CON for all physi-
49. The Senate Report urging passage of the 1979 amendment to the NHPRDA ex-
panding CON coverage to acquisitions by noninstitutional providers stated: "Such ex-
emption of noninstitutional providers has already led to a vast and perhaps unnecessary
proliferation of high-cost technology such as CAT (computerized axial tomography)
scanners, with enormous potential for improper or overutilization and a consequent in-
crease in costs throughout the health system." S. REP. No. 96-96, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. 8,
reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1306, 1313.
50. See id. at 73-74, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 1378-79
(discussing the difference between the original proposal and the amendment that was
enacted).
51. "We believe that the private offices of health practitioners should be subject to
CON review to the extent that those offices are proposing to obtain highly specialized
equipment or develop facilities that are typically provided in an institutional setting."
Health Planning Amendments of 1978: Hearings on S. 2410 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 587 (1978) (statement of John Alexander McMahon, Pres., American Hosp.
Ass'n).
52. The American Medical Association's statement in opposition to the extension of
the CON requirement pointed to the negative effects this extension would have on both
health care availability and health care costs.
We must also consider the possible long range effects of extending certificate
of need to the physicians' office. For example, restricting the physician's use of
medical technology could impede the development and refinement of new medical
discoveries. Such an extension could also lead to an increase in health care costs.
It is well established that many procedures can be performed in the physician's
office less expensively than in a hospital. Applying certificate of need to physi-
cians' practices could restrict the performance of many of these procedures to in-
stitutional settings, thus increasing costs.
We are also concerned that this could lead to the establishment of
"franchises" in medicine that will restrict the availability of medical services to
patients and restrict the entry of new health professionals into the system. This
would adversely affect rural and shortage areas.
id. at 614 (prepared statement submitted by the American Medical Ass'n).
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cians making capital expenditures for major medical equipment,
and requiring a CON for no physicians, was chosen. The result-
ing provision broadened NHPRDA's scope to include noninsti-
tutional health care providers, such as individual physicians or
groups of physicians, to the extent that they acquired expensive
equipment located outside of a hospital but used to service inpa-
tients of a hospital.5 3
Another provision of the 1979 amendment brought within
the scope of CON acquisitions made "on behalf of a health care
facility" as well as acquisitions made "by" the health care facil-
ity itself." Legislative history provides little insight into the.
meaning of "on behalf of a health care facility." Administrative
agencies have interpreted the phrase in a variety of ways, and
the results of the small amount of litigation prompted by the
phrase show no clear trend.6
CON review is a multi-layered procedure. The HSA's and
SHPSA's adopt review procedures and criteria to govern the ad-
ministration of the CON program. The federal legislation re-
quired that the criteria be in accord with those set forth in
NHPRDA and its accompanying regulations.
The major factors that states were required to consider
when formulating their criteria included: (1) the relationship
between the proposal and the health system plan; (2) the rela-
tionship between the proposal and the long term plan of the
provider making the proposal; (3) less costly or more effective
alternatives; (4) the financial feasibility of the proposal and its
effect on the provider's costs and charges; (5) the need that the
serviced population has for the proposed service, and the extent
to which the population, especially its disadvantaged members,
will have access to the services; (6) the extent to which the pro-
posal will meet the health needs of the traditionally medically
63. The amendment was phrased in terms of an exemption. It required all physi-
cians acquiring major medical equipment to file notice of such acquisition with the desig-
nated state agency. Only those acquisitions that would "be used to provide services for
inpatients of a hospital" and those acquisitions for which the state agency learned that
no notice was filed would be subject to CON review. All other acquisitions of major med-
ical equipment by physicians would be exempt from review. Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 117(a),
93 Stat. 592, 618 (1979) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6(e) (1982)).
54. Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 117(b)(3), 93 Stat. 592, 619 (1979) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300n(6) (1982)).
55. See infra note 112 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 159-73.
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underserved; (7) the availability of resources required to provide
the proposed service; (8) the effect of the proposal on the
clinical needs of health professional training programs; (9) the
relationship of the proposal to energy conservation; (10) the ef-
fect of the proposal on competition for using and providing
health care; (11) the efficiency of existing services similar to
those proposed; and (12) the quality of care offered by the pro-
posed provider in the past."0
These criteria went far beyond a determination of actual
need, and relied heavily on an economic assessment of the pro-
posal. Resulting decisions may, therefore, have varied considera-
bly from decisions arrived at from a purely medical
perspective.5 7
The NHPRDA provided that after a health care facility
submitted a completed application for a project, the first level of
review would be conducted by the HSA. 8 This itself might be
multi-layered, with hearings conducted by subarea advisory
councils, HSA review committees, executive committees, or sub-
committees.8 ' The HSA would send its findings and recommen-
dations to the SHPSA, which was required to give consideration
to the HSA's report, but the SHPSA would be ultimately re-
sponsible for the CON decision."0 Furthermore, a provision for
administrative and judicial review was required.61
B. State Laws
Although NHPRDA stimulated state enactment of CON
laws, a number of states had some form of CON requirement
56. 42 C.F.R. § 123.412 (1985).
57. For an analysis of the factors determining "need", see Havighurst & Blumstein,
Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSRO's, 1975 Nw.
UL. Rav. 6, 27.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 122.304 (1985). There may be a requirement for the filing of a letter
of intent preceding a formal application. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 07.030
(Oct. 1980).
59. For a comprehensive outline of the steps involved in CON review, see Barton,
Health Planning Regulation of Hospitals, in REPRESENTING HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 86-
99 (M. Strickler & F. Ballard, Jr., eds. 1981).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6(a)(2), (g) (1982).
61. Id. § 300n-l(b)(12). Administrative agency decisions were required to be upheld
by reviewing courts unless they were "found to be arbitrary or capricious or not made in
Dompliance with applicable law." Id. § 300n-l(b)(12)(E).
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prior to NHPRDA.2 NHPRDA provided only minimal require-
ments, and states were not precluded from imposing more strin-
gent regulations." State CON statutes vary in the extent to
which they satisfied the minimal federal requirements."
When Congress increased the monetary amount above
which major medical equipment and other capital expenditures
became subject to CON review," not all states responded with
similar increases. Consequently, there are wide variations in
monetary thresholds among the states." Additionally, there are
variations in the coverage of certain services irrespective of
threshold.2
Among the states with monetary thresholds below the fed-
eral requirement s is New York. In addition to a $300,000
62. In 1964, New York became the first state to enact a CON statute. Maryland and
Rhode Island followed in 1968; California and Connecticut in 1969; Arizona, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, and Washington in 1971; Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, and South Dakota
in 1972; and Colorado, Tennessee, and Virginia in 1973. CHAYET & SONNENREICH, P.C.,
CERTIPIcATE OF NEEd. AN EXPANDING REGULATION CONCEPT 5-6 (1978).
Louisiana never enacted a CON statute. Letter from Bonnie W. Smith, Louisiana
Bureau of Health Planning, to author (Sept. 15, 1986).
Montana's CON statute is scheduled to expire on July 1, 1987. 1983 MONT. LAWS 329
§ 13.
The following states either repealed or allowed their CON statutes to expire: Ari-
zona in 1985, Letter from Doris Evans-Gates, Arizona Dep't of Health Services to author
(Oct. 15, 1986); Idaho in 1983, Letter from Rose Bowman, Idaho Dep't of Health and
Welfare to author (Sept. 19, 1986); Kansas in 1985, Letter from Ron Henricks, Kansas
Office of Health and Environmental Planning to author (Sept. 12, 1986); Minnesota in
1984, Letter from Sr. Mary Madonna Ashton, Minnesota Dep't of Health to author
(Sept. 12, 1986); New Mexico in 1983, Letter from Thomas D. Regas, New Mexico
Health and Environment Dep't to author (Sept. 16, 1986); Texas in 1985, Letter from
Robert Bernstein, Texas Dep't of Health to author (Sept. 26, 1986); and Utah in 1984,
Letter from Blaine A. Goff, Utah Dep't of Health to author (Sept. 15, 1986).
63. For example, while the federal law did not require a CON for medical equip-
ment costing less than $400,000, New York requires that hospitals acquiring medical
equipment costing $300,000 or more must obtain a CON. Thus, more projects would
come within the scope of CON under the New York monetary threshold than under the
federal monetary threshold. See infra note 68 and accompanying text and text accompa-
nying note 69.
64. For states that failed to satisfy the minimal federal requirements with respect to
monetary thresholds see infra note 75. See also supra text accompanying notes 37-38
(denying federal funds to states in cases of noncompliance).
65. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 68, 72, 75, and accompanying text.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71, 73-74.
68. By requiring a CON for major medical equipment costing less than the $400,000
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threshold, ss New York requires CON review for the following ac-
tivities regardless of cost when they are done by health care fa-
cilities: conversion or addition of beds; therapeutic radiology;
open heart surgery; cardiac catheterization; kidney, heart, liver
and bone marrow transplants; chronic renal dialysis; computer
axial tomography (CAT) scanners; burns care; extracorporeal
shockwave lithotripters; and acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome (AIDS) centers.70 Review is also required for any proposal
which, although less than $300,000, is part of a project exceeding
a total cost of $3,000,000.71
Among the states with thresholds equal to the federal re-
quirement 7' is New Jersey. Additionally, New Jersey requires
federal threshold, the following states impose a greater obstacle to expansion of health
care than did the federal statute: Alabama (major medical equipment, $253,085), Memo-
.randum, Michael 0. Emfinger, Director, Alabama State Health Planning Agency (Aug.
29, 1986); Hawaii (new major medical equipment, $250,000), HAw. REV. STAT. § 323D-2
(1985); Maine (major medical equipment, $300,000; capital expenditures, $350,000), ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 303(12-A), 304-A(3) (Supp. 1986); Rhode Island (for any ex-
penditure resulting in a change in bed capacity or services, $300,000 until June 30, 1987,
$450,000 until June 30, 1988 at which time it will rise to $600,000), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
15-2(10)(B) (Supp. 1985); Vermont (major medical equipment, $250,000), VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2403(a)(3) (Supp. 1986); (capital expenditures, $300,000), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2403(a)(2) (Supp. 1986).
69. N.Y. CoUP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10D, § 710.1(c)(1)(vi) (1986).
70. Id. § 710.1(c)(2)(i)(a), (b).
71. Id. § 710.1(c)(2)(i)(c). This total project threshold makes it more difficult in
some circumstances to circumvent the CON process through piecemeal acquisition. See
infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
72. These states, some of which index the threshold for inflation, are: Alabama
(non-major medical equipment), Memorandum from Michael 0. Emfinger, Alabama
State Health Planning Agency (Aug. 29, 1986); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-155(a) (West 1986); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-302(3)(A)(iv) and
(11)(a)(b) (Supp. 1986); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2(14)(B) and (F) (1985); Hawaii
(replacement of major medical equipment and other capital expenditures including new
major medical equipment), HAw. REV. STAT. § 323D-2 (1985); Kentucky, Ky. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 216B.015(6) (16) (Michie/Bobba-Merrill 1982); Maryland (capital expenditures
other than those for major medical equipment), MD. HRALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-
115(j)(i)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1986); Massachusetts, MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 105, § 100.020 (1986);
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. 197.305(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); Nebraska (major medical
.quipment), NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5831 (Supp. 1984); Nevada, NaV. REV. STAT. §
139A.100-2 (1985); New Hampshire (major medical equipment), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
151-C:2 XXIV (Supp. 1986); New Jersey, N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 33-1.4(a)I, 2 (Supp.
1985); South Carolina, S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control Reg. No. 61-15 § 103(13)
'Apr. 1980); South Dakota, S.D.CoDIFiED LAWS ANN. § 34-7A-23(17), (26) (1986); Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.1 (1985); West Virginia, W. VA CODE § 16-2D-2(i), (t) (Supp.
1986); and Wyoming, Wy. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SocIAL SEavicas, RuLEs AND REGULA-
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CON review for the following activities of health care facilities,
regardless of cost: initiation of new health care services; region-
alized services; bed additions, reductions, or conversions;
changes in a facility that will cause access problems to its tradi-
tionally served population; transfer of a hospital patient care
service from one corporate entity to another; and transfer of
ownership."3 Any acquisition in a twelve month period of a
group of similar equiement units or system parts where each
unit or part is individually below the threshold, but has a cumu-
lative total of over $400,000, requires CON review. 4
A growing number of states increased their thresholds sig-
nificantly above the federal requirement.75 Oklahoma's threshold
for initial acquisition of major medical equipment is the highest
in the nation - $3,000,000." Replacement of major medical
equipment already in use at a health care facility is exempt from
review.7 The threshold for other capital expenditures has been
programmed to escalate from $3,000,000 for fiscal year 1987 to
$5,000,000 for fiscal year 1989.78
All states with CON statutes subject institutional health
care providers to CON review.1' Most states, New Jersey and
New York being notable exceptions, require CON review for
"IONs GOVERNING CERTIFICATE OF NEED, CH. III, § 2 (1985).
73. NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 33-1.4 (Supp. 1985).
74. Id. § 33-2.7(a)2.
75. These states are: Alaska ($1,000,000 threshold), ALASKA STAT. § 18.07.031 (1986);
California ($1,000,000), CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 437.10(d), (e)(3)(A) (West
Supp. 1987); Colorado ($1,000,000, major medical equipment; $2,000,000, other capital
expenditures), COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-503(6.5)(a), (1.5)(a) (Supp. 1984); Indiana
($1,000,000), IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-3.7 (Burns Supp. 1986); North Carolina ($600,000,
major medical equipment; $1,000,000, capital expenditures other than those for major
medical equipment), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-176(15), (16)b (1986); Oregon ($1,000,000,
major medical equipment), OR. REV. STAT. § 442.025(25) (1985); Washington ($1,000,000),
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.38.025(2), (5), (12) (West Supp. 1986); and Wisconsin ($1,000,000),
Dep't of Health and Social Services, Annual Adjustment of Ch. 150, Wis. Stats., Dollar
Threshold, eff. Jan. 1, 1986.
76. 1986 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 149 § 5 (West) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
63, § 2651.2(2)(g)).
77. OKLAHOMA HEALTH PLANNING COMM'N, PROCEDURES FOR PROJEcT REVIEW UNDER
THE STATE CERTIFICATE OF NEED LAws 3 (May 29, 1986).
78. 1986 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 149 § 5 (West) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
63, § 2651.2(2)(e)).
79. An exclusion for HMO's is typical. See, e.g., MAss, GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, §
25C1/ (West 1983). See also supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing federal
exemption for HMO's).
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capital expenditures incurred by or on behalf of a health care
facility.80 The extent to which coverage extends to private physi-
cians acquiring major medical equipment, however, creates sig-
nificant differences among the states.
A number of states require all private physicians to obtain a
CON when acquiring major medical equipment in excess of the
threshold.81 Other states have incorporated into their statutes a
variation of the 1979 federal amendment"2 that extends CON
coverage to physicians who acquire major medical equipment
that will be used to treat inpatients of a hospital."3 A third
80. " 'Reviewable activity' means . . . [tlhe obligation by or on behalf of a health
care facility of a capital expenditure ..... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3702.51(R)(1) (Page
Supp. 1985). This conforms to the 1979 federal amendment. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 54-55.
81. See, e.g. HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-54 (1985):
Nothing in this part or rules thereunder with respect to requirement for certifi-
cates of need applies to ... [olffices of physicians, dentists, or other practitioners
of the healing arts in private practice as distinguished from organized ambulatory
health care facilities, except in any case of purchase or acquisition of equipment
attendant to the delivery of health care service and the instruction or supervi-
sion therefor for any private office or clinic involving a total expenditure in ex-
cess of the expenditure minimum.
Id. (emphasis added).
For similar provisions, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 439A.015 (1985); OI. REV. STAT. §§
442.320(1), 442.340(7) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-15-2(11), 23-15-4 (1985); S.D. CODI-
PIED LAWS § 34-7A-23(26) (1986); W. VA. CODE § 16-2D-4(a) (Supp. 1986); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 150.61(3) (West Supp. 1986).
82. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 § 25C (West 1983):
No person ... shall acquire for location in other than a health care facility a unit
of medical, diagnostic, or therapeutic equipment with a fair market value in excess
of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars unless the person .. . notifies the de-
partment of the person's . . . intent to acquire such equipment and of the use that
will be made of the equipment .... A determination by the department of need
therefor shall be acquired for any such acquisition ... if the department finds...
that the equipment will be used to provide services for inpatients of a hospital
other than on an occasional and irregular basis.
Id.
For similar provisions, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 304-A(2) (West Supp. 1986);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5831 (Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-176(16)(h), 131E-178(c)
(1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.38.105(4)(f)(ii) (Supp. 1987).
Maine is considering expanding its coverage to include the acquisition of certain
equipment, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), by physicians even when not
for regular use for hospital inpatients. Letter from Trish Riley, Maine Bureau of Medical
Services, to author (Oct. 27, 1986).
MRI is a non-invasive diagnostic imaging technique that subsitutes radiowaves and
magnetic fields for the ionizing radiation employed by CAT scanners and ordinary x-
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group has specific statutory exclusions for private physicians. s4
Another group makes little or no provision for private physician
CON coverage. New York's statute addresses only "construction
of a hospital,"88 and is silent regarding private physicians. Con-
necticut is silent with respect to private physicians except for
the acquisition of imaging equipment."
IV. The Institutional Health Care Provider in the CON Maze
A. Burdens Encountered in Complying with Requirements
Once a health care facility decides to make an application.
for a Certificate of Need, there are many potential sources of
delay. The actual application can take months to prepare and,
regardless of how lengthy it is, additional information is fre-
quently requested. 7 For example, the CON application filed by
a group of Connecticut hospitals for a magnetic resonance imag-
ing (MRI) center was over 1400 pages, and the required supple-
rays. It provides pictures that differentiate among types of tissue and does so without
interference from bone. Because of the ability of the technique to detect subtle physical
and chemical differences, it offers the possibility of early detection of disease. E. ST'mN-
BERG & A. COHEN, NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING TECHNOLOGY: A CLINICAL, IN-
DUSTIAL & Poucv ANALYSIS 3 (1984).
84. "No health care facility shall be constructed or expanded, and no new health
care services shall be instituted after the effective date of this act except upon applica-
tion for and receipt of a certificate of need as provided by this act." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:2H-7 (West Supp. 1986); "'Health care service'. . . exclud[es] services provided by a
physician in his private practice .. " Id. § 26:2H-2b. For similar provisions, see ALA.
CODE § 22-21-260(5) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.07.111(9) (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
9302(4) (1983 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-6-47(a)(4) (1985); Ky. REv. STAT. §
216B.020(2)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1986).
85. The New York statute defines "construction" broadly to include "erection,
building, or substantial acquisition, alteration, reconstruction, improvement, extension or
modification of a hospital, including its equipment; the inspection and supervision
thereof; and the studies, surveys, designs, plans, working drawings, specifications, proce-
dures and other actions necessary thereto." N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2801(5) (McKinney
1985).
86. The Connecticut statute provides:
[A]ny person proposing a capital expenditure to acquire imaging equipment hav-
ing a cost exceeding four hundred thousand dollars, including the leasing of such
equipment, which imaging equipment will not be owned by or located in a health
care facility or institution ... shall submit a request for approval of any such
imaging equipment.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-155(b) (West 1986).
87. Interview by the author with Edward M. Kenney, President, Greenwich Hospi-
tal Association, in Greenwich, Conn. (June 30, 1986).
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ment exceeded 1700 pages."8 From conception until final ap-
proval, Greenwich Hospital's noncontroversial and unopposed
request for a CON to replace its telephone system took one year,
and that period was "brief" only because the hospital agreed to
waive its right to a hearing.8'
Review of an application may also be delayed by "batch-
ing," which requires applications for similar facilities or services
to be evaluated contemporaneously and measured against each
other. Many states follow the federal model for batching.' 0 Fur-
ther delays may be caused by declarations of moratoria on re-
view of CON applications.' 1
The cost of applying for a CON can be considerable, exceed-
ing $100,000 for major projects." If litigation is required, the
cost may reach $350,000. 93
There is considerable bargaining involved in CON applica-
tions." The HSA may indicate that it will approve the request
only if the hospital agrees to decertify a specific number of
beds.' In situations where hospitals do not actually possess, nor
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The federal model makes "provision for all completed applications pertaining to
similar types of services, facilities, or equipment affecting the same health service area to
be considered in relation to each other." 42 U.S.C. § 300n-1(b)(13)(A)(iii) (1982).
91. A moratorium on certain types of hospital expenditures is among the methods
attempted by some states to make their CON statutes more effective. REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, supra note 8, at 48.
92. Interview with Edward M. Kenney, supra note 87.
93. Pantalena, Certificate of Need, 6 WiTriER L. Rzv. 845, 845-46 (1984). One ana-
lyst claims that the high cost of litigation is no deterrent to health care facilities because
the cost can be passed along to third party payors. Price, Health Systems Agencies and
Peer Review: Experiments In Regulating the Delivery of Health Care, in LEGAL AsPEcTs
op HATH POLICY: ISSUES AND TRENDs 373 (R. Roemer and G. McKray eds. 1980). This
may be precluded by the greater scrutiny of health care costs now engaged in by third
party payors. Whether third party payors accept this pass-along or not, the fact remains
that dollars are being diverted from direct patient care.
94. Interview with Edward M. Kenney, supra note 87.
95. Wisconsin has a program of "bed banking" which allows hospitals to deactivate
beds without permanently relinquishing the certification for these beds. A hospital may
be required to "bed bank" as a result of its application for approval for a non-bed re-
lated capital expenditure. WISCONSIN DP'T Op HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES. BaD BANK-
ING: WISCONSIN CAPITAL EXPENDrruRz REvIEw PROGRAM (undated). Reactivation of the
'banked" beds must be preceded by notice to the Division of Health and must be based
)n increased patient use of the hospital facilities. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § HSS 123.30(4), (5)
:1985).
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have a present need for the maximum number of permitted
beds, they are reluctant to decertify because, if future circum-
stances require additional beds, they will be compelled to go
through CON review to reinstate the beds." Hospitals want the
flexibility created by a reserve of unused beds. If a hospital is
operating at 80% capacity, the remaining 20% idle capacity is
not truly unproductive. It is a "safety margin," to prevent delays
or denials of admission which can lead to death, pain, and
greater curative costs.'7
A Case Study
Even where a state agency works along with the hospital,
the process of filing a CON application can be burdensome and
unreasonable in the hospital's view. A case in point is the CAT
(Computerized Axial Tomography)" scanner at White Plains
96. Interview with Edward M. Kenney, supra note 87.
97. Phillip, Mullner, & Andes, Toward A Better Understanding of Hospital Occu-
pancy Rates, in HEALTH CARE FINANCING Rav. 53, 54 (1984).
In a protest against the Hudson Valley Health Systems Agency's proposal to de-
crease the number of hospital beds within the HSA's area, Dr. Sanford Kaplan, Chair-
man, Legislation Committee, Westchester Medical Society, stated:
The Westchester County Medical Society is certainly not opposed to reducing
the number of unneeded hospital beds. But what constitutes a lack of need? Cer-
tainly it is not a matter that can simply be extended from occupancy rates (on an
annualized basis). Illness, and consequently hospital occupancy, has seasonal vari-
ation. A bed empty in the summer during vacation periods may be desperately
needed in the winter.
Shall we risk the nonavailability of a bed in dead winter for a patient with an
acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) and sacrifice medicine's enhanced ca-
pacity to salvage life from the throes of death with such patients? One need only
go to the Emergency Rooms of White Plains, Lawrence, St. John's and Northern
Westchester Hospitals - where nightly patients are held in those emergency
rooms for extended hours because of the unavailability of hospital beds - to un-
derstand the complexities of the problems.
Kaplan, Reducing Number of Hospital Beds is 'Politics' and Overlooks Public Need,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1987, § 11 (Westchester), at 32, col. 1.
98. The CAT (also referred to as the CT, computerized transaxial tomography)
scanner is a diagnostic technique that "permits the visualization of structures which are
not noted or poorly noted on traditional x-rays. Its major advantages are its sensitivity
and safety compared to traditional x-rays and other alternatives to x-rays." Draft Memo-
randum of N.Y. Dep't of Health, Feb. 24, 1986 (accompanying proposal to amend CON
statute). See infra text accompanying notes 193-97 (discussing the bill to amend New
York's CON statute to extend coverage to acquisitions of CAT scanners by noninstitu-
tional health care providers as well as by institutional health care providers).
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Hospital Medical Center (WPHMC), White Plains, New York."9
The experience is described here, not because it is an interesting
anomaly, but rather, because it is typical in terms of both the
hospital's actions and the CON process.
In 1976, a number of hospitals in Westchester County, New
York, filed CON applications for CAT scanners. CON's were is-.
sued to New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center and to the West-
chester County Medical Center, with a view toward regional use
of both scanners. The hospitals that were denied the CON's,
WPHMC among them, encouraged their radiologists to obtain
and operate their own CAT scanners. WPHMC's radiologist
opened an office in the basement of the medical office building
located next to the hospital, installed a CAT scanner in the of-
fice, and used it to meet the hospital's CAT scanner needs.
While technically fulfilling the hospital's requirements and
making available what has come to be considered a significant
modality for diagnosing head or spinal trauma, the arrangement
was not without health risks. It meant transporting an injured
patient outside of the hospital and into an uncontrolled environ-
ment, and frequently required sending five or six staff members
along with the patient. In January 1980, the hospital's adminis-
trators met in Albany with the Director of the Office of Health
Systems Management (OHSM) to develop a solution to this un-
safe and costly problem. The Director of OHSM was sympa-
thetic to the hospital's concerns and instructed the hospital ad-
ministration to file a CON application to lease space in the
hospital proper to its radiologist who, in turn, would supply the
CAT scanner and service. The application was filed, went
through several levels of review, and was finally rejected by the
Hudson Valley Health Systems Agency (HVHSA). On appeal,
the rejection was affirmed.
The hospital's administrators returned to the Director of
OHSM, who told them to file again, this time stating that the
hospital would be responsible for billing and quality assurance.
When the CON was still not forthcoming, OHSM advised
WPHMC to send OHSM a letter agreeing to have the radiologist
99. Information regarding the White Plains Hospital CAT scanner was obtained in
an interview by the author with Jon Schandler, President, White Plains Hospital Medi-
cal Center in White Plains, N.Y. (June 25, 1986).
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own the CAT scanner, but lease it to the hospital, which would
operate the scanner. Finally the CON was issued and the
HVHSA chose not to appeal.
This resulted in the placement of a CAT scanner in the hos-
pital. Although the hospital was permitted to lease and operate
the scanner, and bill its patients for the scanner's use, the hospi-
tal was not permitted to own the scanner; the radiologist filled
this role. In October of 1982, the hospital applied for a CON to
own and operate the CAT scanner it housed. The CON was
granted in May 1986, forty-three months after this last applica-
tion, and ten years after the original application was filed.
When the hospital made its initial application, it projected
the use of a CAT scanner at 1,200 scans a year. In the first year
of operation, the scanner use was 2,500 scans. As of June 1986,
its annual use was up to 6 ,000,ies and was the most highly uti-
lized General Electric CAT scanner in the northeast.101
B. Circumventing the Requirements
The burdens imposed by CON review have prompted health
care facilities to seek ways of avoiding the requirement.10'
Among the approaches they have taken are: piecemeal acquisi-
tion of major equipment where the components are below the
monetary threshold for CON review; 08 use of parent corpora-
tions and their subsidiaries to provide benefits to health care fa-
cilities;e 4 and arrangements between health care facilities and
private physicians whereby the private physicians obtain major
100. How much of the increased use is due to "Roemer's law," to the practice of
defensive medicine in the wake of physicians' increasing fears of malpractice suits, or to
more extensive understanding of the technology, needs to be investigated. See supra text
accompanying notes 24-25 (explaining Roemer's law).
101. To achieve the economies that centralization can produce, HSA's in New York
have set minimum uses for CAT scanners. If it does not appear that a proposed CAT
scanner will be called upon to provide the annual minimum number of procedures, the
CON for the CAT scanner will be denied. In 1982, HVHSA lowered its CAT scanner
minimum to 1,800 procedures a year. HUDSON VALLEY HE.ALTH SYsTEMs AGENCY, MEDICAL
FACILITIES PLAN 11 (1983).
102. Health care regulators are not insensitive to the problems involved in the CON
process. Minutes of meetings of the Maine CON Work Group (Apr. 16, 1986, May 21,
1986 and Oct. 7, 1986) reveal concerns about improving the process.
103. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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medical equipment, the benefits of which are made available to
the health care facility.10 5
1. Piecemeal Acquisition
The first of the circumvention devices, piecemeal acquisi-
tion, is illegal in most instances.' 0 e A recent attempt in Mary-
land to categorize a two-story addition to a hospital as two sepa-
rate projects failed.10 7 Attempts have been made in Illinois to
avoid CON review by breaking projects down into smaller units.
Some of these attempts have been successful despite the state's
use of funding sources as a method for linking these smaller
units. Funding source linkage involves the examination of uses
to which projects having a common source of funds are put. 08
Review of projects to determine whether they are functionally
interdependent has been another means employed by Illinois to
deter circumvention of the CON process through piecemeal
acquisition.109
2. Corporate Structure
There is a paucity of cases involving the use of parent cor-
porations to avoid review.110 This method, however, is not un-
common, and is openly employed."' In a typical situation, a hos-
pital seeks to construct a parking garage for the convenience of
105. See infra text accompanying notes 113-54.
106. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216B.061(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982): "No
person shall separate portions of a single project into components in order to evade any
expenditure minimum set forth in this chapter. For purposes of this chapter, the acquisi-
tion of one (1) or more items of functionally related diagnostic or therapeutic equipment
shall be considered as one (1) project."
107. Southern Maryland Hospital constructed a two-story addition and contended
that each floor was a separate project below the monetary threshold and thus not subject
to CON regulations. The Maryland Health Resources Planning Commission and the hos-
pital entered into a consent agreement whereby the hospital would be permitted to use
only one floor of the addition until it received a CON, and the hospital would donate
$25,000 to a charity. Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1986, at C3, col. 3.
108. Letter from Bernard J. Turnock, Director of Public Health of the State of Illi-
nois to author (Oct. 31, 1986).
109. d.
110. Inquiries made by the author to the health departments of each state have
yielded no reported cases involving CON circumvention in this manner, and only a small
number of unreported cases.
111. Interview with Edward M. Kenney, supra note 87.
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its patients and staff. Because the hospital is a health care facil-
ity, and because the garage may involve a capital expenditure in
excess of the threshold, the hospital must apply for a CON. To
avoid this, the hospital creates a parent corporate entity with
two subsidiary corporations, one of which is the hospital. The
second subsidiary is not a health care provider and, arguably,
not subject to the CON statute. It builds and operates the ga-
rage with the result that the hospital has the parking facilities it
requires, without subjecting the project to CON review."1
3. Arrangements Between Health Care Facilities and Pri-
vate Physicians
The third device, arrangements between health care facili-
ties and private physicians, has been possible in states that
failed to extend their CON statutes to physicians' offices in ac-
cordance with the federal amendment. ' Challenges to such ar-
rangements have occurred in New York and New Jersey. 1' The
CON statutes of these two states do not include a counterpart to
the federal amendment that required a CON for acquisitions by
physicians of major medical equipment that would service hospi-
tal inpatients or for acquisitions made on behalf of a health care
facility."'
112. At least one attempt to circumvent CON in this manner failed because the
project was determined to be "on behalf of a health care facility." An injunction was
granted, halting the construction of a four and a half million dollar garage on the
grounds of a District of Columbia hospital. The court held that the builder of the garage,
the corporate parent of the hospital, was acting on behalf of the hospital and was there-
fore required to obtain a CON prior to constructing the garage. District of Columbia v.
Washington Hosp. Center Health Sys., No. 6970-83 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jul. 25, 1983).
113. See supra note 53.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 116-54 (discussing Finger Lakes Health Sys.
Agency v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 81 A.D.2d 403, 442 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dep't 1981), affg No.
2520/79 (Sup. Ct. Chemung County June 20, 1980); Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co. v.
Axelrod, 115 A.D.2d 949, 497 N.Y.S.2d 525 (4th Dep't 1985); and Radiological Soc'y of.
N.J. v. N.J. State Dep't of Health, Hosp. Rate Setting Comm'n, 208 N.J. Super. 548, 506
A.2d 755 (1986)).
115. See infra notes 50-55, 80-86, and accompanying text.
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a. Finger Lakes Health Systems Agency v. St. Joseph's
Hospital
One New York challenge was decided in Finger Lakes
Health Systems Agency v. St. Joseph's Hospital.116 St. Joseph's
was a private hospital in Chemung County in New York that
owned the Elmira Medical Arts Center, an office building lo-
cated thirty-five feet from its hospital building. 1 7 Although the
two buildings were connected by a covered walkway, the Medical
Arts Center was a separate entity from the hospital and did not
have the tax exempt status enjoyed by the hospital." 8 The Med-
ical Arts Center's tenants were private physicians who treated
patients on an outpatient basis. 119
In 1978, before there was a CAT scanner in Chemung
County, the Finger Lakes Health Systems Agency (FLHSA) ad-
vised the hospitals in the area that it was developing plans for a
CAT scanner and anticipated designating only one scanner for
the county. 120 Upon learning this, and in disregard of FLHSA's
request that hospitals take no action until its plans were formu-
lated,"' St. Joseph's constructed an addition to the Medical
Arts Center.2 2 The hospital leased the addition to a doctor who
installed in it a CAT scanner that he had leased from a third
party who had acquired it with private funds.12 3 No CON was
applied for or received. 124
In its action against St. Joseph's for violation of New York's
CON statute, FLHSA argued that St. Joseph's was the real
owner and operator of the CAT scanner and had acquired it in
violation of the law. 2 ' Although the hearing officer stated in his
findings that he was unable to determine if St. Joseph's was of-
fering the CAT scan service, he did conclude that the hospital
116. 81 A.D.2d 403, 442 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dep't 1981), af'g No. 2520/79 (Sup. Ct.
Chemung County June 20, 1980).
117. Finger Lakes Health Sys. Agency v. St. Joseph's Hosp., No. 2520/79, slip op. at
5 (Sup. Ct. Chernung County June 20, 1980).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id. at 10.
125. Id. at 9-10.
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was giving the public the impression that it was offering the
service. 26
The trial court concluded that the arrangement may well
have been devised to avoid CON review, but that there was
nothing in it that violated the letter of the law. 11 7 The hospital
did not need a CON to construct an addition to its office build-
ing because the office building was not a hospital or part of a
hospital, not constructed under the hospital building code, and
did not have the hospital's tax exempt status.128 The rent that
the leasing doctor paid to the hospital was rationally related to
the construction costs.1 2 ' The court found it irrelevant that the
motive may have been to avoid the law. The law itself had not
been violated.130 Of particular significance to the court in reach-
ing this conclusion was the absence of any exclusive access to
the CAT scanner on the part of the hospital's physicians. "
The Appellate Division neither accepted nor rejected the
trial court's reasoning, but upheld its decision because the CAT
scanner arrangement was a fait accompli, and it found no useful
purpose to be served by reversing the decision.1 32 The Court of
Appeals declined to review this holding. 1 3
b. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co. v. Axelrod
A recent challenge " 4 to a similar scheme was also resolved
in favor of a hospital. In this case, however, the reviewing court
reached the issues. Using private funds, Clifton Springs Sanita-
rium purchased a trailer which it installed on its grounds eight
feet from its hospital building. " A walkway and electrical lines
connected the trailer to the hospital building.13 6 The trailer was
leased to a staff radiologist who leased, and later purchased, a
126. Id. at 8.
127. Id. at 26.
128. Id. at 27.
129. Id. at 27-28.
130. Id. at 29.
131. Id. at 28.
132. 81 A.D.2d at 408-09, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 223 (3d Dep't 1981).
133. 55 N.Y.2d 606, 449 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1982).
134. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co. v. Axelrod, 115 A.D.2d 949, 497 N.Y.S.2d 525
(4th Dep't 1985).
135. Id., 497 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
136. Id.
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CAT scanner.' 3 The radiologist performed CAT scans on inpa-
tients of Clifton Springs Sanitarium, inpatients of other hospi-
tals, and outpatients in the area.se No CON was obtained.' 3'
New York State brought an action against the hospital for
operating a CAT scanner without a CON.1 40 The Administrative
Law Judge' 4 ' concluded that the hospital had violated the law,
and the state then ordered the doctor to discontinue performing
CAT scans on patients of Clifton Springs Sanitarium.'4 The Ap-
pellate Division annulled the determination, holding that a CON
was not required because the CAT scan services were provided
by a private physician and not by the hospital.14 3 The court took
note that the trailer was purchased with private money and was
not part of the hospital or constructed according to the hospital
building code; 44 that the scanner was the property of the doc-
tor; 4 5 that the doctor was not required to perform scans on the
hospital's patients; 14 and that the radiologist paid the staff and
billed the patients directly. 47 Here, again, the Court of Appeals
declined to review the decision. 14
c. Radiological Society of New Jersey v. New Jersey State
Department of Health, Hospital Rate Setting Commission
Conversely, a New Jersey court, deciding Radiological Soci-
ety of New Jersey v. New Jersey State Department of Health,
Hospital Rate Setting Commission,'"4 read that state's CON
statute as being applicable to private physicians who provide
services to inpatients of a hospital. 50 Despite the New Jersey
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In conformity with the federal requirement, New York makes judicial review
available following agency adjudication. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
142. 115 A.D.2d at 949, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
143. Id. at 949-50, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
144. Id. at 950, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 67 N.Y.2d 609 (1986).
149. 208 N.J. Super. 548, 506 A.2d 755 (1986).
150. Id. at 561, 506 A.2d at 762.
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statute's private physician exclusion,6 1 the Radiological court
held that a physician who acquires a CAT scanner and magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) equipment must first obtain a CON.
In so holding, the court relied on a regulation " adopted by the
New Jersey Department of Health in response to the 1979 fed-
eral amendment extending CON coverage to physicians in such
situations.15 3 The court relied additionally on a New Jersey De-
partment of Health regulation giving the department the right
to deny reimbursement for services provided to hospital inpa-
tients where state or federal CON regulations are violated. '" It
would thus appear that, had the court found that the state
health regulation subjecting the physicians in this case to CON
review was not authorized by the state statute, it would never-
theless have denied the physicians' reimbursement because they
failed to comply with federal CON regulations.
V. Analysis
The potential for institutional health care providers to ex-
pand their services or make capital acquisitions without CON
review depends on the degree to which the state statute con-
forms to federal requirements with respect to thresholds and to
providers covered.
The states with high thresholds for review 55 stimulate less
interest in circumventing CON review because it is easier for a
health care facility to stay within the limits."' States with lower
thresholds spawn efforts on the part of health care facilities and
151. See supra note 84 (excluding physicians from CON review).
152.
Acquisition of major movable equipment not owned by or located in a hospital
requires a Certificate of Need if the acquisition is made by or on behalf of a
central services facility or will result in the creation of a central services facility
and the equipment will be used to provide services to inpatients of one or more
hospitals and the acquisition results in a capital expenditure greater than
$150,000 per unit.
208 N.J. Super. at 554, 506 A.2d at 757-58 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 33-1.5(d)(3))
(emphasis in original).
153. Id., 506 A.2d at 757.
154. Id. at 555, 506 A.2d at 758 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 31B-4.32(d)).
155. See supra note 75.
156. "The usual way of avoiding review is to develop projects which do not exceed
the expenditure minimums." Letter from Michael E. Henry, Missouri Dep't of Health, to
author (Oct. 10, 1986).
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physicians to circumvent the literal requirements of CON legis-
lation. Separating projects into individual below-threshold units
is one such attempt."7 In most circumstances, however, such
"separation" is illegal by statute.156
The use of creative corporate structuring devices to avoid
review depends upon whether the state statute includes a CON
requirement for acquisitions on behalf of a health care facility" 9
and, where it does have this requirement, how the phrase on be-
half of is interpreted. For example, a Washington, D.C., court
read this language to include the benefit to a hospital of a park-
ing garage developed by a subsidiary of the hospital's corporate
parent.' 60 Illinois takes the position that any project that "will
serve hospital inpatients, places the hospital at financial risk or
is governed by the hospital administration"'' 6 is deemed to be
on behalf of the hospital, and therefore subject to review.162
A Nebraska court, on the other hand, has interpreted on be-
half of more narrowly, holding that a separate tax entity that
constructs a physicians' office building adjacent to a hospital is
not subject to CON, because on behalf of does not necessarily
mean for the benefit of.'63 The Nebraska case involved two enti-
ties. The first was the Lincoln Hospital Association (LHA), a
not-for-profit corporation formed to build, endow, and maintain
Lincoln General Hospital (LGH), which it transferred to the
City of Lincoln.""' LHA was a separate tax entity from LGH. It
invested and supervised assets donated to it. " ' LGH was the
157. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
158. There are several ways in which states prevent separation into components for
the purpose of avoiding CON review. Maine requires that the cost of studies, plans, and
other preacquisition activities be included in the cost of a project. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 303 (12-A) (West Supp. 1986). New Jersey requires a CON review for the acqui-
sition of a group of similar units of equipment the total cost of which exceeds $400,000 in
a 12 month period. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 33-2.7(a)(2) (Supp. 1985). See also supra
note 106.
159. See supra note 80.
160. See supra note 112.
161. Letter from Bernard J. Turnock, Director of Public Health of the State of Illi-
nois, to author (Oct. 31, 1986).
162. Id.
163. State v. Coleman, No. 354-194 (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. Sept. 24, 1982).
164. Plaintiffs Petition for Injunction at 2, Coleman (No. 354-194).
165. Coleman, No. 354-194, slip op. at 2.
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second entity. Prior to 1979, there had been an "alter ego''6s
relationship between LHA and LGH. In 1979, the Lincoln City
Council required that the two entities maintain separate legal
identities and that they not have interlocking board
memberships. 167
The controversy arose when LHA entered into a contract
for the construction of an addition to a medical office building
that it had leased from LGH and that was on LGH property.'"
The state, arguing for CON review, contended that the recita-
tion of benefits to the hospital in the lease - e.g., the physical
proximity of the offices of its medical staff to the hospital build-
ing - was evidence of an expenditure on behalf of the
hospital.169
LHA maintained that this was not the sort of activity that
the statute covered. LHA embarked on the project after making
a careful determination that the project would be profitable.1 70 If
a corporation without LHA's historical relationship with LGH
were to construct a medical office building adjacent to LGH,
there would indeed be a benefit to LGH, but no one would argue
that the resulting building was on behalf of the hospital. It
should be no different in this situation.17 1 LHA's reasoning pre-
vailed and, accordingly, the court decided in its favor.17M The
state did not appeal.1 7 3
It would thus seem that, if there is an interest being served
other than the hospital's, the fact that the hospital's interest is
being served as well, will not cause that activity to be character-
ized as one that is on behalf of the hospital. But, if the hospital
is the sole beneficiary, the project would probably be considered
on behalf of the hospital.
166. The "alter ego" doctrine involves a blurring of the distinction between two en-
tities whereby a corporate entity may be merely a conduit for the transaction of a stock-
holder's private business. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (5th ed. 1979).
167. Letter from Douglas L. Curry, Esq. to Marilyn B. Hutchinson, Ass't Att'y Gen'l
(June 16, 1981).
168. Defendant's Answer at 1, Coleman (No. 354-194).
169. Plaintiff's Petition for Injunction at 3, Coleman (No. 354-194).
170. Letter from Douglas L. Curry, Esq. to Dave Calhoun, Chairman, Lincoln Hos-
pital Association (Aug. 13, 1981).
171. Id.
172. Coleman, No. 354-194, slip op. at 2.
173. Letter from Douglas L. Curry, Esq. to author (Oct. 24, 1986).
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Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1979 amend-
ment adding the on behalf of language to the federal law offers
no clear indication of the meaning of the term. Because the
phrase was part of the same comprehensive amendment that in-
cluded the elimination of the physician loophole,174 it may be
inferred that Congress intended the on behalf of language to
widen the range of reviewable entities. This reasoning, however,
can hardly be transferred to those states that have adopted the
on behalf of language, but have failed to adopt provisions sub-
jecting physicians to CON review.
Where statutes specifically cover private physicians,
whether in all their major medical acquisitions or only in their
acquisitions that will regularly be used to service hospital pa-
tients, 75 the wide extent of the law is clear. These states fol-
lowed the lead of Congress' physician amendment 76 and passed
laws effectuating an intent to close a loophole by widening the
scope of the statutes.
A potential exists for misreading the scope of the statutes
that are silent regarding physicians. Because the federal amend-
ment was couched in terms of a physician exemption - "a cer-
tificate of need shall not be required for the acquisition of major
medical equipment which will not be owned by or located in a
health care facility unless. . . the equipment will be used to pro-
vide services to inpatients of a hospital '  - it might appear
that statutes not containing similar provisions include physi-
cians. Legislative history of the amendment reveals, however,
that Congress was concerned that the statute, as originally writ-
ten, excluded physicians. 7 8 The amendment, although phrased
as an exemption, was an expansion of CON coverage to physi-
cians in particular circumstances - the servicing of hospital in-
patients. It would be incorrect to infer from the amendment's
language that the statute, when silent on physicians, applied to
physicians.
Where state statutes are silent regarding physicians, or
174. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
175. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6(e)(1)(A) (1982).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
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specifically exclude physicians, the legislatures have decided,
whether by choice or by neglect, not to extend their CON cover-
age to physicians. It is in these states that opportunity exists for
health care facilities to work in concert with physicians to avoid
review.
Radiological Society of New Jersey v. New Jersey State
Department of Health, Hospital Rate Setting Commission"'
provides an illustration of such collaboration between a health
care facility and a private physician. The failure in that case to
circumvent the CON requirement resulted from the court's will-
ingness to rely on a state regulation that extended CON cover-
age to acquisitions of major medical equipment not owned by or
located in a health care facility, but used to serve the patients of
a health care facility.1 80 The court's reliance on this regulation,
however, was misplaced because the regulation was not author-
ized by the state statute.
While the court correctly interpreted the intent of the 1979
federal amendment to broaden the scope of CON to all acquisi-
tions used for inpatients, the court improperly viewed the
amendment to the federal statute as authorization for the New
Jersey state regulation.8 ' When confronted with evidence that a
loophole in the NHPRDA was permitting avoidance of CON re-
view,"' 2 Congress acted to amend its statute. The Department of
Health and Human Services then acted to amend its regulations
to conform to the statutory amendment.1 83 Faced with this man-
date from the federal government to extend CON coverage,
179. 208 N.J. Super. 548, 506 A.2d 755 (1986). See supra notes 149-54 and accompa-
nying text.
180. See supra note 152.
181. "In an effort to comply with this minimum federal requirement, the New
Jersey Department of Health revised its regulations for the certificate of need program
on August 6, 1981." 208 N.J. Super. at 554, 506 A.2d at 757.
182. See supra text accompanying note 49.
183. State CON programs must apply to acquisitions of major medical equipment
that will be located in a health care facility, and to
acquisition[s] by any person of major medical equipment not owned by or located
in a health care facility, if (A) the notice of intent required by § 123.406(a) is not
filed in accordance with that paragraph, or (B) the State Agency finds, within 30
days after the date it receives a notice in accordance with § 123.406(a), that the
equipment will be used to provide services for inpatients of a hospital.
42 C.F.R. § 123.404(a)(4)(ii) (1985).
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many states amended their statutes.' 8' New Jersey, however,
was not among these states. Its legislature never made the deci-
sion to amend its CON statute to comport with the federal stat-
ute. Instead, the New Jersey Department of Health usurped
state legislative authority by amending its own regulations.8' If
all that was necessary was a change in department regulations,
one wonders why a substantial number of states and the United
States Congress went through the extensive legislative process of
amending their statutes. Where the New Jersey legislature had
the federal model before it and did not follow that model, it is
unreasonable to infer that the legislature intended its statute to
be interpreted as though it did follow the federal model.'5 6
The NHPRDA was a mandate to the states to enact CON
legislation, as well as a model for that legislation. The federal
statute itself was not addressed to health care providers and
placed no demands on them. These demands could be made
only by the individual states in the exercise of their police
power. 87
184. See supra note 83.
185. Ohio joins New Jersey in having a regulation covering physicians acquiring ma-
jor medical equipment for use with inpatients, without having a statutory provision spe-
cifically authorizing the regulation. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3701-12-05(D)(2)(b) (undated).
Ohio differs significantly from New Jersey in that the Ohio legislature wrote into its
statute a provision indicating its intent that the Ohio law conform to the federal. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3702.52(A), (B) (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1985). Ohio's regulation cov-
ering physician acquisitions may be authorized by this umbrella statutory provision. A
caveat, however, applies to all Ohio's CON regulations: "For many reasons, the rules do
not comport with the statute. As you are aware, the statute takes precedence over the
rules when there is a conflict." Letter from Louis Pomerantz, Ohio State Dep't of Health,
to author (Sept. 23, 1986).
186. A situation analogous to Radiological arose in New York. Peck v. Whalen,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 1980, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1980). In the New York
dispute, the state agency had ordered a physician partnership to cease operation of a
CAT scanner that it had purchased without obtaining a CON, and that it had installed
on premises leased from a hospital. The court found that the state agency had no author-
ity to act against the physician partnership because New York's statute applied only to
hospitals. Justice Slifkin criticized the agency for "confus[ing its] supervisory functions
with legislative functions." Id. at col. 7.
187. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of CON
legislation).
The NHPRDA acknowledged the need for state authorization of state agency ac-
tions in its requirement that the state programs "contain or be supported by satisfactory
evidence that the State Agency has under State law the authority to carry out such
functions ...." 42 U.S.C. § 300m-1(b)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
19871
33
PACE LAW REVIEW
The Radiological'" court and the New Jersey health agency
failed to recognize this distinction and confused federal statu-
tory authority with state statutory authority. The court upheld
the agency's reliance on a regulation that it had promulgated
and that gave the Health Commissioner the right to disapprove
reimbursement for the purchase by a health care facility of ser-
vices from a vendor who is in violation of state or federal CON
regulations.'69
This agency regulation assumes that it is theoretically possi-
ble for one who sells services to health care facilities to violate
federal CON regulations. It is an indispensable precondition to-
being found in violation of a requirement that one be subject to
that requirement. Since, however, the federal CON statute, and
regulations promulgated pursuant to that statute, made de-
mands of the states and not of individual health care providers
or their vendors, only the states can violate the federal regula-
tions. The assumption that it is possible for one who sells ser-
vices to health care providers to violate federal CON regulations
is, therefore, fallacious.
The New Jersey court would have been wiser had it ex-
amined the New York courts' decisions'" to refuse to read into
their statute a requirement that the state legislature failed to
write into the statute.1' "
In New York, the legislature has been given several oppor-
tunities to amend its statute and has declined.19e In 1986, a bill
188. 208 N.J. Super. 548, 506 A.2d 755 (1986).
189. "The Commission shall have the right to disapprove reimbursement for ser-
vices purchased from vendors that are in violation of State or Federal certificate of need
regulations." Id. at 555, 506 A.2d at 758 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 31B-4.32(d)).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 116-48. See also supra note 186.
191. Alaska's statute resembles New Jersey's in that it excludes private physicians.
See ALASKA STAT. § 18.07.111(9)(B) (1986). In response to an inquiry Alaska's Attorney
General declared that a group of physicians leasing space from a hospital for MRI equip-
ment is exempt from the CON requirement where the leased space is adjacent, but not
attached, to the hospital; the hospital is not involved in the purchase of the MRI; and
the hospital's patients contract directly with the physicians for the MRI services. The
Attorney General declared that until Alaska's legislature amended its statute, this acqui-
sition would be exempt from review. 1985 Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. (Feb. 11, 1985) (LEXIS,
states library, Alaska file).
192. "[E]fforts in recent years to bring privately owned equipment used on hospital
inpatients within the State's CON requirements have consistently failed to obtain legis-
lative approval." Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co. v. Axelrod, 115 A.D.2d 949, 950, 497
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was introduced in the New York State Assembly that would
make certain acquisitions by individual doctors subject to the
same CON review to which hospitals are subject. 193 This legisla-
tion would have amended New York's CON statute'" to require
prior approval for the acquisition, through purchase, lease, or
donation, of major medical equipment in excess of $400,000, by
any health provider, not merely by institutional providers.19 5
The bill would exempt from its requirements units of equipment
that are individually below $400,000, but in the aggregate above
$400,000, when they are acquired by a doctor who is establishing
an office. 19
The New York State Department of Health, at whose be-
hest the bill was introduced, believed that an amendment was
necessary because the unregulated sector has made increasing
purchases of major medical equipment, and thus, has counter-
acted the state's efforts at centralization. 97 Of particular con-
cern to the bill's supporters was what they perceived to be the
premature proliferation of MRI equipment, the efficacy of which
the state is still studying.'9e
This bill was never reported out of the Assembly's health
committee, to which it had been referred.' 9" It failed to receive
any significant support from the medical community. Private
physicians are not likely to welcome such regulation. From the
perspective of the hospitals, the proposal would eliminate the
presently unregulated sector as a source of competition, but it
would also eliminate a significant method by which the hospitals
can avoid CON review.
By going further in the coverage of physicians than the fed-
eral law, the New York proposal would avoid an inequity that
some health planners noticed in the federal law. Frequently,
agencies evaluating a hospital's CON application are forced to
N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (4th Dep't 1985).
193. N.Y.A. 10448, 209th Sess. (1986).
194. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2800-2802 (McKinney 1985).
195. N.Y.A. 10448, § 1.1, 209th Sess. (1986).
196. Id. § 1.7.
197. Draft Memorandum of State Dep't of Health, Feb. 24, 1986.
198. Id.
199. LEGISLATIVE BILL DRAFTING COMM'N, STATE OF NEw YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST
1986 A725.
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deny the application because the proposed acquisition will pro-
vide a service that is already being offered in the area by a pri-
vate physician acting independently of the hospital101 It may
well be that the proposed service is one that would be provided
more appropriately in the hospital environment than in a physi-
cian's office. 201 If the agency were to approve the acquisition by
the hospital, it would be encouraging the oversupply of expen-
sive medical equipment that it is required to prevent.
VI. Efficacy of CON
Where states have written their statutes to make circum-
vention possible, institutional health care providers have at-
tempted to take advantage of the opportunities created.
Whether it is desirable to close the loopholes that permit cir-
cumvention of the CON process is a policy decision that should
be made only after an evaluation of the efficacy of the process. If
the process does not make a significant contribution toward cost
containment and equitable distribution of health care resources
and if it provides, as some critics suggest, an obstacle to im-
proved health care, 03 it may be that the CON requirement
should be abandoned. 0 3
200. Price, Health Systems Agencies and Peer Review: Experiments in Regulating
the Delivery of Health Care, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY: ISSUES AND TRENDS
373 (R. Roemer & G. McKray, eds. 1980).
201. Id.
202. One health care professional has pointed to the CAT scanner experience as
demonstrative of the negative impact that the CON process can have on the quality of
health care.
As now structured, the CON process is not well suited to control the alloca-
tion of expensive new technologies in a community. An example is the introduc-
tion of the computerized axial tomography (CAT) scanner, which has revolution-
ized radiology in the past five years. The rate of development of knowledge about
CAT scanning has far outstripped the capacity of the regulatory process to adjust
to new information. Regulations in this field were obsolete even before formal pro-
mulgation. The need for research on the use of the CAT scanner and research
using this new technology are not recognized in regulations. Research thus fore-
gone may to an indeterminate degree adversely affect the quality of care for years
to come.
Covell, The Impact of Regulation on Health Care Quality, in REGULATING HEALTH CAMW
THE STUGGLE FOR CONTROL 114-15 (A. Levin ed. 1980).
203. There has been no scarcity of proposals for alternatives or supplements to
CON. One example is the prospective payment system first adopted in New Jersey in
1980. With Medicare expenses growing at an annual rate of approximately 15% since
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Viewed in terms of equitable distribution of health care re-
sources, the effect of the CON process has been limited. There is
little evidence that HSA's have initiated programs for under-
served areas. HSA's are largely reactive. When reviewing
batched applications,210 an HSA may grant approval to the pro-
ject that will best meet the needs of a traditionally underserved
population,2 05 but, if no application is made, the HSA does not,
on its own, institute a program.2 06
Success of the CON process in cost containment is similarly
questionable. Health care costs continue to grow.207  For the
years 1965 through 1970, prior to the federal CON requirement,
the medical components of the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
grew at an annual rate of 6.1%, while the non-medical CPI grew
at a rate of 4.1%. For 1982 through 1983, when the CON process
was firmly in place and its full effects should have been appar-
ent, the medical component was 8.7% while the non-medical
CPI grew at a minimal annual rate of 2.9%.108 Thus, even with
CON, health care costs are growing at a substantially greater
rate than the rest of the economy. The extent to which CON has
kept health care costs from growing at an even faster rate re-
mains to be established.
The possibility of eliminating annual increases in the cost
1978, the federal government began experimenting with a program resembling New
Jersey's in 1983. In a prospective payment system, fees received by a hospital for caring
for a patient are set in advance of the treatment, according to diagnosis. The federal
program affects only Medicare payments. R. BUCHANAN & J. MINOR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
HEALTH CARE REIMBURSEMENT 23 (1985). See also Enthoven & Noll, Prospective Pay-
ment: Will It Solve Medicare's Financial Problem?, 1 IssuEs Sci. & TECH. 101 (1984)
(critiquing the prospective payment system along with alternate proposals for cost
containment).
While some proposals, such as the prospective payment system, involve regulation,
others involve a degree of deregulation, in the belief that competitive market forces can
achieve an appropriate solution to health care distribution and cost problems. See gener-
ally INCENTIVES VS. CONTROLS IN HEALTH POLICY (J. Meyer ed. 1985).
204. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
205. See supra text accompanying note 56.
206. New Hampshire is an exception to the reactive nature of HSA's. When its
Health Service Planning and Review Board determines that there is a need for addi-
tional health services, it publishes a request for the submission of applications. Only
those applications made in response to such requests are considered. N.H. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. § 151-C:8(I) (Supp. 1986).
207. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
208. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH UNITED STATES 127 (1985).
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of health care, or of holding the increases to modest levels, is
uncertain. One prominent physician suggests that all our efforts
to lower the cost of medical care through elimination of ineffi-
ciencies and unnecessary procedures will still produce an annual
rise in health care costs of close to 7%. Of this amount, 3.5%
represents technological change, while the remaining increase
can be attributed to population growth and to the labor inten-
sive characteristic of the industry.20 '
The enormous expenditure of time and money by both ad-
ministrative agencies and health care providers in complying
with the CON process substantially reduces any savings that
might be attributable to it.1' For all its promise, CON review
has resulted in the elimination of few projects. Of over 20,000
CON applications reviewed throughout the country between
1979 and 1981, only ten percent were ultimately disapproved.'
Such statistics prompt understandable concern as to the wisdom
of continuing to invest significant amounts of time, money, and
effort on the CON process.
It has been suggested that the CON process actually in-
creases the cost of providing health care.21' By delaying invest-
ments, the CON requirement guarantees inflation-induced in-
creases in costs. The substitution of expensive labor for capital
investment in an already labor intensive industry increases total
health care costs. By discouraging the entry of new providers,
giving, in effect, a franchise to existing providers, CON elimi-
209. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment Strategies, in
J. A.M.A. 220, 221-22 (1987).
Dr. Schwartz argues that "even if all useless care were gradually eliminated, we
could anticipate only a temporary respite from rising costs unless the forces sustaining
the real rate of change - chiefly technologic innovation and rising input prices - were
simultaneously brought under control." Id. at 220-21. However, "ilf... the essence of
cost containment hinges on limiting the introduction and diffusion of beneficial new
technology, there must eventually be some kind of society-wide decision that this is a
necessary step." Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
210. See P. JOSKOW, supra note 21, at 84-85.
211. RzERoT To CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 48. This figure, however, represents only
the percent of filed applications that were rejected and not the percent of dollar expendi-
tures rejected. This figure may be tempered by the fact that the prospect of CON review
may dissuade hospital administrators from developing plans for projects they anticipate
will be rejected. The result, however, may not be entirely salutary because among the
abandoned projects may be ones of great value to the quality of health care.
212. Id. at 124-25.
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nates competition and the restraining effect that competition
can have on prices.2 '
Even if a highly restrictive CON approach would effectuate
large expenditure reductions, it would also have the potential for
creating problems of excess demand and of hostility from pa-
tients who believe that their health care needs are no longer be-
ing met.2 1 ' While health care regulators seek to rationalize the
health care system, health care consumers want to feel that
when family members fall ill, they will have convenient access to
the best and most technologically advanced medical care. At-
tempts to regulate availability of resources create a tension be-
tween health care consumers and providers on the one hand, and
health care regulators on the other.215
CON may be an unnecessary burden in states that regulate
hospital fees. 16 If a service is underutilized and the loss cannot
be spread over other services, good management should dictate
its elimination or curtailment without the intervention of the
CON process.2 17
VII. Conclusion
The elimination of Title XV of the Public Health Service
Act2 8 compels states to reassess their CON programs and the
overall health planning programs of which they are a part. Hav-
ing lost the federal funding for these health planning programs,
the individual states must determine whether to continue the
programs entirely at state and local expense.
The lack of convincing evidence that CON programs make a
significant contribution to health care cost containment, or to a
more equitable distribution of health care resources, 19 suggests
213. Id.
214. See P. JosKow, supra note 21, at 88-89.
215. D. ALTMAN, R. GREENE & H. SAPOLSKY, HEALTH PLANNING AND REGULATION: THE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 153-54 (1981) (studying regulation and health planning in
New England states).
216. Abernethy and Pearson attribute New York's relative success in eliminating
underused facilities not to CON, but to the state's maintenance of reimbursement rates
at levels that have forced some hospitals into bankruptcy. D. ABERNETHY & D. PEARSON,
supra note 1, at 65.
217. See supra note 39.
218. See supra text accompanying note 11.
219. See supra notes 203-17 and accompanying text.
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that states should develop and implement alternative ap-
proaches to solving these problems. 220
Should a state determine, however, that CON programs
have value and merit a role in the state's health planning
scheme, the state must make a judgment regarding the scope of
the program - the activities and providers that should be in-
cluded. Current statutes must then be examined and refined to
ensure that they are clear reflections of legislative intent. Where
legislatures want their statutes to have a broad scope, covering a
wide range of activities and providers, the statutes must be un-
ambiguous expressions of this legislative intent in order to pre-
vent subversion of the intent by health care providers employing
circumvention techniques. Where the legislative intent is to nar-
row the scope of CON programs, legislatures have the responsi-
bility to draft their statutes in such a manner that no opportu-
nity is provided for the agencies administering the CON
programs to overstep the intended boundaries.
Failure of legislatures to engage in this re-examination will
result in continued circumvention of the law on the one hand,
and overreaching by administrative agencies on the other. More
importantly, failure to engage in a probing re-examination of the
problems of rising health care costs and inequitable distribution
of health care resources will create an even greater distance be-
tween those problems and their solutions.
Roberta M. Roos
220. See supra note 203.
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